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Structured Abstract: 
 
Purpose - The Android pattern lock screen (or graphical password) is a popular user 
authentication method that relies on the advantages provided by the visual representation of 
a password, which enhance its memorability. Graphical passwords are vulnerable to attacks 
(e.g. shoulder surfing), thus the need for more complex passwords becomes apparent. In 
this paper, we focus on the features that constitute a usable and secure pattern and 
investigate the existence of heuristic and physical rules that possibly dictate the formation of 
a pattern. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We conducted a survey to study the users' understanding 
of the security and usability of the pattern lock screen. We developed an Android application 
that collects graphical passwords, by simulating user authentication in a mobile device. This 
avoids any potential bias that is introduced when the survey participants are not interacting 
with a mobile device while forming graphical passwords (e.g. in web or hard-copy surveys). 
 
Findings - Our findings verify and enrich previous knowledge for graphical passwords, 
namely that users mostly prefer usability than security. Using the survey results we 
demonstrate how biased input impairs security by shrinking the available password space. 
 
Research limitations/implications – The sample’s demographics may affect our findings. 
Therefore, future work can focus on the replication of our work in a sample with different 
demographics. 
 
Originality/value - We deﬁne metrics that measure the usability of a pattern (handedness, 
directionality, symmetry) and investigate their impact to its formation. We propose a security 
assessment scheme using features in a pattern (e.g. the existence of knight moves or 
overlapping nodes) to evaluate its security strengths. 
 
Keywords: 
Graphical password, pattern, vulnerability, user, authentication. 
 
Article Classification: Research paper. 
 1 Introduction 
Recently, the mobile device industry experienced a remarkable technological and 
economical bloom. Smartphones and tablets are now valuable multi-purpose tools assisting 
users to complete numerous tasks in their personal and professional lives. Innovative ideas 
take advantage of the capabilities that the new technology provides and focus on personalized 
user identification methods to protect sensitive data. One of the most recent approaches to the 
user identification problem is fingerprint detection. Flagship devices are now equipped with 
fingerprint identity sensors and algorithms that claim to be secure enough. At the same time, 
they provide a convenient and fast way to authenticate their users. However, at the moment, 
this technology is only available to expensive devices and it is already vulnerable to various 
attacks [1]. Therefore, it is important to further examine user authentication methods and 
expose aspects that make them vulnerable. 
In general, the most common user authentication methods rely on text-based passwords 
(Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) or alphanumeric strings). It is quite common for a 
PIN to be a four-digit code, but an alphanumeric string can be longer and it can also include 
letters, digits and other characters and symbols. Despite their global use and acceptance, text-
based passwords suffer from vulnerabilities that are closely related to the fact that they have 
to be memorable. These vulnerabilities can be exploited by popular attacks, such as dictionary 
attacks.  
The security issues introduced by the usage of memorable text-based passwords and the 
need for more convenient authentication schemes led to the proposal of graphical passwords. 
This scheme employs images, pictures or various shapes to create novel and usable 
authentication methods. In the mobile devices’ ecosystem, the Android pattern lock screen 
was introduced in the second version of the operating system (OS). It is a popular gesture-
based authentication mechanism, which urges the user to draw a pattern within the limits of a 
3×3 nodes grid in order to unlock the device. Users swipe their fingers connecting at least 4 
nodes to form their graphical passwords. The fourth version of the Android OS introduced a 
new scheme called ‘Face unlock’. It utilizes the device’s camera to identify the face of its 
owner. However, the method is naive as it can be bypassed using a photograph of the owner. 
Hence, Android pattern lock screen is still a more reliable alternative authentication 
mechanism that provides usability and security.  
The pattern lock screen is getting more popular, which increases the interest to examine its 
vulnerabilities. As smartphones contain a large amount of personal and business data, privacy 
and confidentiality can be breached if an adversary breaks the authentication method. Android 
developers claim that it is possible to bypass the authentication method if USB Debugging 
Mode is enabled [2]. However, the drawback of this attack is that USB Debugging Mode is 
not enabled by default. Also, the device must be restarted, thus, any temporary file stored in 
volatile memory will be lost.  
In this paper we mount a survey and collect patterns that the users deem as usable and 
secure. With the analysis of the collected patterns, we study the usability and security of the 
Android pattern lock screen. The contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
• We developed an Android application to simulate password input on real devices and 
gather realistic results.  
• We define metrics for pattern complexity. We use them to evaluate the complexity of 
the participants’ patterns and thus their security strength.  
• We examine if properties such as handedness, symmetry and native language writing 
style affect patterns’ usability and security. 
• Based on our results we demonstrate with a case study the dramatic shrinking of the 
graphical password space that biased input can cause. 
Our findings, which come from a large and diverse sample, confirm common results that 
were based on web-surveys and hard-copy questionnaires (Aviv, et al., 2010), (Andriotis, et 
al., 2013), (Uellenbeck, et al., 2013). Our findings can be used to mount a dictionary attack 
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against a given pattern and/or in combination with other attacks (e.g. smudge attacks) increase 
the likelihood of recovering an Android pattern.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and Section 
3 introduces our methodology for data collection and our definitions. Section 4 discusses our 
results and Section 5 demonstrates with a case study the security issues that can be caused by 
biased input. Finally, Section 6 includes our conclusions and future work.   
  
2 Background 
The choice of a text-based password must balance the memorability and convenience a usable 
alphanumeric string provides against the safety of a complex combination of symbols and 
letters (Sasse, et al., 2001). Unfortunately, users tend to prefer usability choosing memorable 
passwords that are easy to recall (Bonneau, 2012). Despite the various studies which propose 
schemes that enhance security without decreasing usability (Forget, et al., 2008), text-based 
passwords are still vulnerable to dictionary attacks (Ding and Horster, 1995). 
With the proliferation of mobile devices, new authentication schemata that were based on 
graphical password input emerged (Biddle, et al., 2012). They rely on the efficiency of the 
human brain to accumulate visual information, making a graphical password easier to recall 
(Standing, et al., 1970). However, graphical passwords are also vulnerable to attacks; 
shoulder surfing (Tari, et al., 2006), (Zakaria, et al., 2011), brute force attacks (Botelho, et al., 
2012) and smudge attacks (Aviv, et al., 2010) are among the most popular in the literature. 
The principles that define the design of a graphical password vary. Passfaces for example 
[3] use a 3×3 grid containing photographs that the user clicks to form a password. The 
usability of such schemes was studied in (Brostoff and Sasse, 2000). However, schemes based 
on face selection often present security problems, as humans tend to choose faces that attract 
them (Davis, et al., 2004). Other popular graphical authentication algorithms prompt users to 
click on different spots on given images. Studies showed that despite their large ‘password 
space’, users tend to select specific regions on the images (Thorpe and van Oorschot, 2007). 
As a result, this biased input produces passwords with high predictability (van Oorschot and 
Thorpe, 2011). Additionally, the formation of a graphical password involves the human 
nature, thus, it might be influenced by behavioural heuristic rules, making a scheme 
vulnerable to image-based dictionary attacks (van Oorschot and Thorpe, 2008).  
The Android pattern lock screen schema can be seen as a mutation of previous algorithms. 
A characteristic example is the Draw a Secret (DAS) method that was used to serve early 
mobile devices (Jermyn, et al., 1999). Users have to draw shapes on an N×N grid to 
authenticate. A variation of the scheme is the Background Draw a Secret (BDAS) (Dunphy 
and Yan, 2007), which adds a background image to the grid to improve its usability. Another 
user authentication method that could be seen as the closest to the Android pattern lock screen 
is the Pass-Go scheme (Tao and Adams, 2008). The method is based on the introduction of 
nodes (indicators) that help users to form edges and well-defined lines (very similar to the 
pattern lock). Recent proposals aim to enhance the security of graphical passwords facilitating 
haptic parameters such as pressure and velocity to the final authentication schema (Orozco, et 
al., 2006). Others try to distinguish different drawing styles based on the user’s personality 
(Gao, et al., 2008).  
The rules for the creation of an Android pattern are simple. The pattern must connect at 
least 4 nodes. Its length cannot exceed 9 nodes given that a node can be visited only once. In 
addition, the pattern will always connect the first node, which is along its path. This means 
that it is not feasible to ‘jump’ over a node. Finally, a pattern can cross an already visited 
node to connect a neighbour node. 
Some vulnerabilities of the Android pattern lock screen were exposed in (Aviv, et al., 
2010). With the use of a camera, smudge attacks were performed on smartphone screens to 
recover traces and oily residues left by their owners. The overall password space of the 
authentication scheme was also calculated (using brute force methods). The authors in 
(Andriotis, et al., 2013) replicated these experiments and were particularly interested in 
human factors that might affect the choice of a pattern. They investigated the occurrence of 
specific attributes such as sub-patterns and starting points and combined smudge attacks with 
their conclusions to reveal patterns drawn on smartphones. In a recent work, Uellenbeck et al. 
(2013), studied the actual user choices of patterns with a large-scale user study. They 
evaluated the strength of the patterns and argued that even a small change in the pattern 
layout can make the authentication more secure.  
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Our work is inspired by (Aviv, et al., 2010), (Andriotis, et al., 2013), (Uellenbeck, et al., 
2013) and our goal is to further examine their validity by conducting a survey designed for 
actual Android devices. The basic differentiation from these works is that our collected data 
do not suffer from problems introduced when the participants do not interact directly with a 
device, by using pen-and-paper or online surveys. 
 
3 Methodology 
Our work aims to reveal behavioural heuristic rules that might affect the formation of 
patterns in Android devices. Our goal is to simulate the user authentication scheme and 
collect graphical passwords. This avoids the potential bias that is introduced when the survey 
participants are not interacting with a mobile device while forming their passwords (e.g. with 
a computer monitor using the mouse), which is a considerable limitation of previous studies 
(e.g. (Andriotis, et al., 2013)).  
To this end, we developed an application (app), which was distributed through Google 
Play, i.e. Android’s official app marketplace. Survey participants installed our app to their 
mobile devices and answered demographic questions, namely gender, age, educational level, 
their linguistic characteristics (their native written language) and their handedness. Then, they 
evaluated their understanding about computer security, they were asked if they used any lock 
screen security measure and clarified the reason for this choice. Then, similarly to (Andriotis, 
et al., 2013), they drew two patterns: (a) a usable pattern (easy to remember and use) and (b) a 
secure pattern (more complicated). The participants were allowed to draw the same pattern 
for the two categories. Finally, they selected the pattern they would prefer to use on their 
device (Appendix A includes the structure of the questionnaire). 
The app was also communicated via social media and in a variety of university related 
groups (e.g. CSS- University of Bristol Computer Science Society), but the distribution of the 
app through the Google Play contributed to the diversity of our sample. Anonymity was 
assured and duplicate entries were discarded during analysis. 
We start our analysis with basic statistic measures, i.e. average mean µ of sets of data 
using the standard arithmetic mean formula, and, the standard deviation σ of the set of values. 
Then, we continue our analysis by examining (a) pattern complexity and (b) pattern 
symmetry.  
 
3.1 Pattern Complexity 
Our analysis is based on the assumption that security involves complexity when we are 
dealing with passwords; the more complex a pattern is, the more secure it is considered to be. 
Based on previous literature (Sun et. al, 2014), we set four metrics to measure the complexity 
of a pattern (c.f. Figure 1a. for the positioning of nodes in the grid), namely: 
 
• Pattern length is the number of the nodes that constitute a pattern. 
• Directional Changes are encountered when three consecutive nodes do not form a 
straight line (for example (364) or (786)). 
• Overlapping nodes are the nodes that are crossed more than once. 
• Knight moves are the edges that connect distant nodes (for example 07 or 05). 
3.2 Pattern Symmetry  
We define two types of symmetry for the Android pattern lock screen: 
• Line of Symmetry is a straight line (defined by 3 consecutive nodes) that divides the 
pattern into two parts, which are mirror images to each other. Our definition initialises 
the lines (048) (147) (246) (345) as Lines of Symmetry for the Android pattern lock 
screen (Figure 1b). 
• Rotational Symmetry happens when the pattern can be rotated by 180◦ and still looks 
the same without taking into consideration its directionality. Thus, node 4 will be 
considered as the centre point of the Rotational Symmetry (for example Figure 3(a) 
depicts a pattern with Rotational Symmetry). 
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We provide more examples of symmetric shapes: Figure 3(b) shows a symmetric pattern 
with Line of Symmetry (147), and Figures 3(e),(g) depict symmetric patterns with Line of 
Symmetry (246). 
 
3.3 Usability Features 
In this work we study how factors, such as handedness and linguistic style, affect (or not) 
the conception of a pattern as usable and effective. Thus, a major part of our analysis 
considers the handedness and the native written language of the respondents, particularly the 
direction of writing. The respondents had to choose their answers from a list, specifically: a) 
left-handed, b) right-handed, c) ambidextrous. Similarly, the list for native written language 
and style included: a) Left-To-Right Latin Alphabet (e.g. English, Spanish, German), b) Left-
To-Right Cyrillic Script (e.g. Russian, Serbian, Ukrainian), c) Left-To-Right Abugida Style 
Script (e.g. Hindi, Bengali, Thai), d) Right-To-Left Abjad Style Script (e.g. Arabic, Hebrew, 
Farsi, Urdu), e) Top-To-Bottom Logographic Style (e.g. Chinese, Japanese, Korean).   
We assume that users would be partially influenced by usability features such as their 
handedness and direction of writing, when they draw patterns. The way they are used to write 
would probably guide them to start their patterns from specific points using specific parts of 
their hands, such as their index fingers or thumbs. Also, to easily recall their passwords, they 
would not add a lot of security attributes in their patterns, making them easier to break. 
 
4 Survey Results and Discussion 
Out of 388 unique participants 68.6% were male and 25% were female, whereas 6.4% 
chose not to disclosure their gender. 35.8% of the respondents were between 25 to 39 years 
old, 30.7% were 16 - 24 years old, 21.6% were under 16, 9.8% were 40 - 64 years old, and the 
rest 2.1% were over 65. Thus, our results are biased towards younger ages, but as these users 
constitute the early adopters of technology, we consider that our analysis provides 
considerable insight to the creation of graphical patterns by Android users. Moreover, as 
Android is the most popular OS for mobile devices, we regard that our results provide 
insights about the creation of graphical patterns in other OSes.   
The education level of our sample is also diverse. 21.1% of them were postgraduates, 
18.3% were graduates, 19.6% were on high-school educational level, 11.9% placed 
themselves in higher levels of education (doctorate) and 29.1% replied using the choice 
‘None’. Considering the respondents’ computer security literacy, 36.6% replied that they had 
‘Little or None’ knowledge of security, 34.5% had ‘Fair Good’ understanding, 15.5% knew 
the fundamentals and 13.4% considered themselves as experienced.  
Regarding the use of lock screen mechanisms, 23.5% of the participants use the pattern 
lock scheme, which was the most popular lock screen mechanism in our sample. Among the 
rest of the participants, 19.7% use a password, 13.8% prefer the numeric PIN authentication 
and 12.5% use ‘Other methods’. Finally, 30.5% did not use any authentication mechanism, 
which means that one out of three of the participants do not lock their devices, verifying 
previous studies (Mylonas et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, w.r.t the reason their device gets locked our results suggest that: 31.7% 
protect their personal data, 28.6% prevent people fiddling with their phone, 11.2% prevent 
friends and family making calls or sending texts, 10.1% avoid device theft, and 18.4% named 
other reasons. Our study examines the effect of handedness and directionality of the 
participants’ written native language and the respective demographics were: 62.4% right-
handed, 24.2% left-handed, 7.2% ambidextrous, and 6.2% chose not to reveal their 
Figure 1: a) Node Arrangement, b) Lines of Symmetry, c) Node Allocation 
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handedness (‘Unknown’). The majority of the respondents (65.7%) chose ‘Left-To-Right’ 
Latin writing style as their native language and 8.5% used the ‘Right-To-Left’ reply, ‘Left-
To-Right Abugida’ and ‘Top-To-Bottom Logographic’ were chosen by 5.7% respectively, 
and 4.3% chose the ‘Left-To-Right’ Cyrillic option. 
 Our analysis revealed that only 29% of the participants entered two different patterns - 
most of them preferred to provide the same patterns for both categories (simple and complex). 
While the reasons for this outcome fall outside the scope of the current work, this might 
suggest that they do not understand pattern complexity or do not know how to create a 
complex pattern. The results suggest that the majority of participants (60.8%) preferred the 
simple pattern, 12.6% preferred the complicated one, and 26.5% replied that they would use 
something between the simple and the complicated pattern. This is a first and clear indication 
that most of the survey participants prefer usability against security when creating a graphical 
password for their mobile device. This trend led us to focus our analysis on simple patterns, to 
investigate the characteristics and attributes that make them usable. 
 
Table 1: Mean Length of the Simple (µ1) and Complex Patterns (µ2) for Each Gender Response 
<Please insert here Table 1 > 
 
Table 1 presents a dissection of the pattern’s length, which is one of the basic 
characteristics that constitute the complexity of a pattern (Aviv and Fichter, 2014). The results 
indicate that if an individual is asked to input a simple and then a complicated pattern, it is 
more likely for the complicated pattern to have larger length. Despite the fact that only 29% 
of the participants entered two different patterns, there is still a strong indication that secure 
patterns tend to cover more nodes of the grid. The overall mean length of the simple patterns 
was 6.22 and the mean length of the complicated was 6.56. This is a notable increase if one 
considers the limitations of the 3×3 grid. The direction changes used for secure passwords are 
also an attribute that makes a pattern more complex. Figures 2a and 2b depict a comparison of 
lengths and directional changes that simple and complex patterns present. The results suggest 
that a complex shape is usually longer than a simple one. In addition, easy to use patterns 
present less directional changes than the more complicated ones. 
Our results verify the findings presented in (Andriotis, et al., 2013) about the complexity 
of patterns, regarding their lengths and directional changes. Andriotis et al. (2013) showed 
that the mean length of an ‘easy’ pattern was 6.19, whereas the mean length of a ‘secure’ 
pattern was 6.64. Also, the average number of directional changes was 2.74 for the ‘easy’ and 
3.57 for the ‘secure’ patterns. The contribution of the current work can be stressed by the fact 
that in this study we had a larger number of participants. Furthermore, the respondents used 
their own devices to form the passwords, thus the user authentication simulation was highly 
realistic. 
The rest of the discussion focuses on the analysis of the usability features of the ‘easy’ 
patterns set. Thus, the fact that only 29% of the participants provided a different ‘secure’ 
pattern does not affect the merits of our work, as we focus on the ‘simple’ patterns, which 
were provided by all respondents.  
 
Figure 2: Comparison between Simple and Complex Patterns Considering their a) Lengths and b) 
Directional Changes 
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4.1 Most Popular Patterns 
Despite the relatively wide password space the Android pattern lock screen mechanism 
provides, some specific shapes were more popular in our survey. These shapes resemble 
letters (or numbers) of the Latin alphabet, such as Z, M, N, L. Figure 3 presents the most 
popular patterns that were used by approximately 30% of the participants of our survey. The 
pattern in Figure 3(a) was chosen by 9% of the respondents and it seems to be the most 
common shape we could expect to see. 
 
Table 2: Symmetric Shapes in Our Set 
<Please insert here Table 2 > 
 
Moreover, Figures 3(a),(c),(f),(j) present patterns with Rotational Symmetry and Figures 
3(b),(e),(g) are also symmetric - with Line of Symmetry, as discussed in Section 3.2. Overall, 
70% of the top patterns are symmetric and this can be an explanation for their popularity - 
excluding the fact that these shapes reconstruct well-known symbols. In terms of complexity, 
the top patterns are fairly simple. The top eight have less than three directional changes (five 
of them present just 1 or 2 directional changes). However, most of these top patterns have a 
fairly large length, with six out of ten using seven or more nodes. Thus, our results prove that 
a lengthy pattern is not always a secure pattern. A secure pattern must contain more 
characteristics to be less predictable. Finally, the aforementioned finding can be used to create 
graphical dictionary attacks for pattern lock screens. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Symmetric Patterns 
The presence of symmetry in the most popular patterns urged us to examine if any 
particular heuristic rule exists behind the pattern formation, which makes symmetry a 
fundamental feature for its construction. Therefore, we investigated the symmetric attributes 
(definitions in Section 3.2) of all patterns that were collected (simple and complex). Our 
results show that only 28.54% of the patterns in our set were symmetric. Among them, 
20.85% included Rotational Symmetry and 7.69% had a kind of linear symmetry. Table 2 
illustrates that line (147) is the most common Line of Symmetry. 
Table 2 also indicates that patterns with Rotational Symmetry are the most common 
symmetric shapes (73.05%). This is reasonable if one considers the proliferation of such 
graphical passwords in the pattern set. Patterns such as (6304258), (0364852), (0367852) are 
quite common and symbolize letters (M, W, U), having the line (147) as Line of Symmetry. 
Figure 3: Most Popular Patterns 
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In general, our results indicate that symmetry is a valuable attribute that participates as a 
behavioural and visual asset to our understanding of a graphical password. However, more 
complex patterns do not present a form of symmetry. Thus, the usability of a pattern can be 
enhanced by symmetric concepts we preserve in our minds. This bias results in very 
predictable patterns that are also quite common in our set (c.f. Section 4.1). 
 
4.3 Usability Study 
Previous studies investigated various features that can be extracted from a pattern (such as 
the starting positions or common bigrams and trigrams) and presented results disclosing the 
existence of certain biases during the formation of the graphical passwords (Andriotis, et al., 
2013), (Uellenbeck, et al., 2013). This work not only validates these results, but it offers 
additional information about the features that make a pattern to appear as usable. For this 
reason, we also studied the effects of handedness and linguistic style, making the assumption 
that individuals holding the device with a specific hand (left or right), might behave 
differently when entering patterns. Additionally, the way the participants write might affect 
the way they form graphical passwords for their mobile devices. Since the survey participants 
prefer to use simple patterns, which is an indication that simple patterns are considered as 
more usable, the rest of this sub-section discusses our findings for the set of simple patterns. 
 
Table 3: Handedness Effect on Starting Position Choice 
<Please insert here Table 3 > 
 
 
Table 4: Native Writing Language Effect on Starting Position Choice 
<Please insert here Table 4 > 
 
4.3.1 Starting Position 
Previous studies revealed that users tend to start their patterns from the top left corner.  
Also, other popular starting points in (Andriotis, et al., 2013) were nodes 2 and 6. Table 3 
summarizes the effect of the participants’ handedness on the start of the simple pattern. 
Position 0 was the most popular starting position (54.4% of respondents). Moreover, it was 
more likely to be chosen by left-handed than right-handed respondents (with 62.8% and 
50.8%, respectively). Regarding the second most popular start of simple patterns the 
respondents tended to prefer position 6.  
We also examined the starting point position in relation to the direction of the native text, 
as shown in Table 4. One would assume that Left-To-Right writers would be more inclined to 
start on the left side of the pattern space. The results shown at Table 4 depict this trend and 
position 0 is still the most popular starting position. Right-To-Left writers selected position 0 
less than others (45.5% of all Right-To-Left users). Node 2 (the top-right position) was 
chosen by the 18.2% of Right-To-Left respondents, over twice the rate of Left-To-Right 
respondents (8.5%). Top-To-Bottom writers also tend to pick the top row of positions as a 
starting point. Thus, these results confirm the hypothesis that the direction of writing affects 
the pattern construction, particularly the selection of the pattern’s starting point. Our results 
also verify the findings in (Andriotis, et al., 2013), (Uellenbeck, et al., 2013) considering the 
pattern's starting point. Another interesting finding is that node 5 is rarely selected as the 
starting point (only 1.1% of the sample). Table 4 also demonstrates that number 6 is a popular 
starting node.  
 
4.3.2 Monograms 
We define as monograms the distinct nodes in a pattern. Each position can occur at most 
once and we are interested in their frequencies. Our analysis reveals that node 4 is the most 
popular monogram (appearing in 86% of the patterns). In addition, we collected the frequency 
of each monogram in relation to the direction of native writing and the handedness of the 
participants (c.f. Table 5). Table 5 does not provide any distinctive habits or biases. However, 
the results suggest that nodes 2 and 8 (located at the right hand side) were the most visited 
nodes from the Right-To-Left participants, excluding the ‘popular’ node 0 and the central 
node 4.   
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Table 5: Frequency of Monograms Based on Direction of Native Writing 
<Please insert here Table 5 > 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Bigrams 
A bigram is a sub-pattern that consists of two connected nodes. The ten most popular 
bigrams in our survey are presented in Figure 4. Our results suggest that horizontal 
directionality is more likely to occur, as the four most frequent bigrams are the (01), (12), (67) 
and (78). We also examined any possible association of the bigram frequencies between 
bigrams, native writing direction and handedness (c.f. Tables 6-7).  
Table 6 reveals a high occurrence of the bigrams (67) and (78) at Top-To-Bottom native 
language respondents. This may stem from the popularity of the L shaped pattern, which was 
the 6th most popular pattern. The L shaped pattern is noticeably the only pattern that starts 
with a downward direction in the top 10 patterns. However, there is no obvious difference 
between Left-To-Right and Right-To-Left respondents. Table 7 reveals a higher rate of right-
handed respondents using bigrams on the right hand side, such as (25) and (58), while left-
handed participants are more likely to use left side bigrams, such as (63). The difference of 
frequency between left-handed and right-handed respondents (namely 7%) could be 
considered a fair indication given that the average response rate of these bigrams is around 
20%.  
 
Table 6: Frequency of Bigrams Based on Direction of Native Writing 
<Please insert here Table 6 > 
 
Table 7: Frequency of Bigrams Based on Handedness of Respondent 
<Please insert here Table 7 > 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Most Popular Bigrams 
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4.3.4 Trigrams 
The most popular trigrams are presented in Figure 5. Apparently, many of these trigrams 
contain a combination of two bigrams from section 4.3.3. The first observation is that (012) is 
the most frequent trigram, appearing in almost one third of the patterns. Our results might 
indicate a possible association of the pattern formation with native writing directionality and 
handedness, as shown in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively. The results do not suggest a 
considerable alteration of the behavior between Left-To-Right and Right-to-Left participants. 
However, Table 8 indicates that Top-To-Bottom writers did not produce trigrams such as 
(630) and rarely used other trigrams such as (785). The directionality of such sub-patterns 
implies a Bottom-To-Top notion of writing and the participants with a Top-To-Bottom 
writing style did not use them. Additionally, right-handed respondents tend to use trigrams 
located at the right hand-side, such as (258), more frequently than the left-handed (c.f. Table 
9). 
These findings enhance our initial assumptions that the usability of graphical password 
scheme depends on the handedness and the native writing of the user. Our analysis 
demonstrated the most common and popular patterns and sub-patterns and indicated that the 
way participants write influences the formation of pattern. 
 
Table 8: Frequency of Trigrams Based on Direction of Native Writing 
<Please insert here Table 8 > 
 
Table 9: Frequency of Trigrams Based on Handedness of Respondent 
<Please insert here Table 9 > 
 
4.4 Security Study 
As already mentioned in Section 4, approximately 29% of the respondents provided two 
different patterns; a simple and a more complex. The complexity of a pattern is closely related 
to its security. This work provided details about the length and the directional changes 
(Section 4) and concatenated them in Table 1. A comparison between our findings and the 
results presented in (Andriotis, et al., 2013) showed that the conception of a pattern’s 
complexity is closely related to its length and its directional changes. In addition, this work 
examined other attributes that could project different aspects of complexity, i.e. overlapping 
nodes and knight moves (c.f. Section 3.1). 
Focusing on the participants who created two different patterns, the overlapping nodes and 
the knight moves within the set of secure patterns were examined. Table 10 shows the 
occurrence of the features; the second column presents their percentage inside the whole set 
Figure 5: Most Popular Trigrams 
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with the secure patterns and the third column shows the number of overlapping nodes or 
knight moves that occurred among the complex patterns with the specific characteristics. For 
instance, among the patterns that contained at least one overlapping node (18.83% of the total 
‘secure’ patterns), only 6.9% were shapes that had 3 overlapping nodes. Table 10 illustrates 
that among the secure patterns only 18.83% had at least one overlapping node and 9.09% 
contained at least one knight move. The patterns that had one overlapping node were the 
93.1% of the aforementioned set. The results show that even though participants aim to create 
a secure pattern, they do not form passwords with overlapping nodes. When they do so, they 
just overlap the shape once. 
The same observations can be made for knight moves. It is somewhat hard to include a 
knight move in the pattern, not only because one might not think or know the existence of 
such an option, but also because the grid is very narrow and thus it is physically hard to reach 
two distant nodes. Table 10 confirms the assumption. Only 9.09% of the secure patterns 
contained at least one knight move. Among them, the majority (64.29%) contained one knight 
move, 14.29% contained two and 21.42% included seven knight moves. The latter patterns 
were representations of asteroid shapes and each edge was a knight move. Finally, only 2.6% 
of the secure patterns contained both overlapping nodes and knight moves. 
As a conclusion, even though overlapping nodes and knight moves increase the 
complexity of a pattern, our results show that it is less likely for users to include them in their 
(secure) patterns. This might stem from the lack of sufficient guidance from the OS, when 
users enter for the first time a pattern to lock the screen. Thus, our results suggest that users 
who create patterns needed more training regarding the creation of secure patterns. 
 
Table 10: Overlapping Nodes and Knight Moves within the Secure Patterns Set 
<Please insert here Table 10 > 
 
5 Case Study 
The results regarding the usability and security features of Android’s pattern lock screen 
will be used herein to demonstrate vulnerabilities that might occur by the predictability of the 
users’ behaviour. To serve this purpose we developed a brute force program that produces all 
available patterns (namely 389,112 unique patterns). 
We will study the case where a usable (simple) pattern is entered as a password in an 
Android device. Our survey suggests that more that 50% of the users will start their patterns 
from the top left corner and over 85% of the provided patterns will cross node 4. Hence, by 
filtering the patterns with shapes that include these characteristics we can reduce the password 
space (c.f. Table 11). According to the results of our survey, these candidates are almost the 
half of the population who use the pattern lock screen and prefer a convenient password.  
The impact of biased input on user authentication can be realized by focusing on the set of 
patterns with the most popular length, i.e. 6 nodes. The overall number of such patterns 
according to our results from the brute force method is 26,016. However, the available 
password space for the users who start from node 0 and cross node 4, shrinks significantly 
(approximately 90%, c.f. Table 11).  
Our results suggest that participants did not use knight moves, even when they were 
creating a secure pattern. In the usable pattern set, 9.18% of the respondents used overlapping 
nodes and only 3.78% used knight moves. Therefore, a usable pattern is less likely to contain 
a knight move. If we focus again on usable patterns of the previous set, which start from node 
0, cross node 4 and also omit knight moves, then the password space for patterns of length 4, 
5 and 6 shrinks even more (c.f. Table 12). Finally, the password space can be further 
decreased by including more findings from the user study. For instance, one of the most 
popular trigrams in our survey was (012). The addition of this parameter to the case study 
reduces the number of patterns with length six to 20, passwords of length five to 6 and there is 
only one pattern with length four (0124) (c.f. Table 12). 
This case study demonstrates that the results of our survey can significantly reduce the 
password space of the Android pattern lock screen. Our findings can be combined with data 
from the physical device, directly from its screen (e.g. traces or residues originated by the use 
of the phone), to increase the likelihood of recovering the graphical password. Such traces 
could be some nodes or edges (in other words bigrams and trigrams) of the pattern. 
 
Table 11: Number of Possible Patterns for the 9-node Pattern Authentication Scheme with Specific Attributes 
<Please insert here Table 11> 
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Table 12: Decreasing the Password Space Using More Attributes from the Survey 
<Please insert here Table 12> 
 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
Creating a graphical password is a process that involves visual stimuli, understanding of 
security and subconscious biases driven by the way we are used to act in our daily lives. In 
this paper, we developed an Android application to conduct a survey that would collect sets of 
usable and secure patterns. We analyzed the collected patterns to study the existence of 
heuristic rules that may affect the formation of such a graphical password. Subsequently, we 
used our findings in a case study to stress the importance of the balance between usability and 
security. In our case study, we were able to reduce the password space of patterns with length 
6 by 99.92% (20 choices out of 26,016). 
Our work regarding the creation of patterns validates common results presented in 
previous studies, which used pen-and-paper or online surveys for data collection. Contrarily, 
in this work we simulated the creation of patterns on real Android devices, which avoids 
potential bias that is introduced when the survey participants are not interacting with a mobile 
device while forming their passwords. This work attempts to justify biases such as the trend 
to start the pattern from the top left node and the inclusion of node 4 to the vast majority of 
patterns. Also, the survey showed that participants prefer to use a simple pattern rather than a 
more complex one. We examined the effect that handedness, symmetry and native writing 
style have on the perception of a usable pattern and we further illustrated the preference to 
popular shapes that resemble Latin letters. We also defined metrics for pattern complexity 
(pattern length, directional changes, overlapping nodes and knight moves). We examined 
their existence in the collected patterns to evaluate the complexity of the participants’ patterns 
and, thus, their security strength.  
Our work suggests that users need more training regarding the creation of secure patterns. 
This holds true as in our survey users (a) opted for usability and not for security with regards 
to pattern creation and (b) created patterns that can be easily recovered. Currently, when 
Android users see the interface that enables them to create a pattern, they are presented with 
simplistic instructions on how to create a pattern that (a) do not explain the importance of the 
complexity of a pattern and (b) do not list all the available moves (e.g. knight moves). 
Training users to create more complex patterns by including knight moves, overlapping nodes 
and random starting points can avoid behavioural attacks as the ones presented in this work. 
Entropy is a measure used to describe the uncertainty in a random variable. As future work 
we plan to compare our empirical results with entropic measures that are commonly used in 
information theory. Another direction of future research would be the creation of a password 
meter that warns users about the strength of a chosen graphical password. 
 
 
Notes 
1 'Spoofing fingerprints', https://srlabs.de/spoofing-fingerprints/ (Accessed June 2, 2015). 
 
2 xda developers, '[Android][Guide]Hacking And Bypassing Android Password/Pattern/Face/PI', 
http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=2620456 (Accessed June 2, 2015). 
 
3 'Science Behind Passfaces', http://www.passfaces.com/enterprise/resources/white_papers.htm, 
(Accessed June 2, 2015). 
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Appendix  
A. Online Questionnaire  
 
The following list includes the different options that were presented to the survey participants 
by the Android application we implemented. 
  
• Gender 
    – Male 
    – Female 
    – Undisclosed 
• Age 
    – Under 16 
    – 16-24 
    – 25-39 
    – 40-64 
    – Over 65 
• Level of Education  
    – None or Very Little 
    – Second School / High School 
    – Further Education 
    – Graduate Level 
    – Postgraduate Level 
• Handedness 
    – Left-Handed 
    – Right-Handed 
    – Ambidexterity 
• Native Written Language 
    – Left-To-Right Latin Alphabet (e.g. English, Spanish, German) 
    – Left-To-Right Cyrillic Script (e.g. Russian, Serbian, Ukrainian) 
    – Left-To-Right Abugida Script (e.g. Hindi, Bengali, Thai) 
    – Right-To-Left Abjad Script (e.g. Arabic, Hebrew, Farsi, Urdu) 
    – Top-To-Bottom Logographic (e.g. Chinese, Japanese, Korean) 
• Understanding of Computer Security 
   – Very little knowledge 
   – Some fundamental knowledge 
   – Fairly good understanding and knowledge 
   – Expert and highly experienced 
• Current usage of Lockscreen Security 
    – Don’t own a device 
    – Don’t use any Lockscreen Security 
    – Use PIN Authentication 
    – Use password Authentication 
    – Use pattern Authentication 
    – Use other form of Authentication 
• What best describes the reason for current Lockscreen Security 
    – Don’t own a device or don’t use any Lockscreen Security 
    – To protect personal data 
    – To protect sensitive business or organization data 
    – To stop family and friends making calls, emails, texts, etc. on phone 
    – To avoid device theft issues 
    – To stop people fiddling with my phone 
• Entry of a simple, easy to remember Lockscreen Pattern 
• Entry of a more complicated, hard to remember Lockscreen Pattern 
• Preference on which pattern to use 
    – Simple but easier-to-remember pattern 
    – Complicated but harder-to-remember pattern 
    – Pattern somewhere between simple and complicated 
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Table 1: Mean Length of the Simple (µ1) and Complex Patterns (µ2) for Each Gender Response 
 Simple Complex 
|µ1 − µ2| 
µ1 Σ µ2 σ 
Male 6.19 1.688 6.63 1.778 0.44 
Female 6.29 1.708 6.46 1.750 0.18 
Other 6.32 1.676 6.20 1.732 0.12 
All 6.22 1.689 6.56 1.768 0.34 
 
 
Table 2: Symmetric Shapes in Our Set 
Symmetry Type % in Total % in Symmetric Set 
Rotational 20.85 73.05 
Line (147) 5.67 19.86 
Line (246) 4.86 17.02 
Line (345) 1.01 3.57 
Line (048) 0.40 1.42 
 
 
 
Table 3: Handedness Effect on Starting Position Choice 
 
Handedness 
Start Position of Simple Pattern 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Ambidexterity 57.1% 0.0% 7.1% 7.1% 3.6% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 10.7% 
Left-Handed 62.8% 4.3% 7.4% 3.2% 7.4% 0.0% 9.6% 2.1% 3.2% 
Right-Handed 50.8% 5.8% 10.3% 6.2% 1.7% 0.8% 19.8% 2.1% 2.5% 
All 54.4% 4.9% 9.3% 5.5% 3.3% 0.5% 16.8% 1.9% 3.3% 
 
 
Table 4: Native Writing Language Effect on Starting Position Choice 
 
Direction 
Start Position of Simple Pattern 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Left-To-Right 53.4% 4.1% 8.5% 6.1% 4.1% 1.4% 16.3% 2.4% 3.7% 
Right-To-Left 45.5% 0.0% 18.2% 6.1% 3.0% 0.0% 21.2% 3.0% 3.0% 
Top-To-Bottom 63.6% 18.2% 9.1% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
All 53.3% 4.6% 9.5% 5.7% 4.0% 1.1% 16.0% 2.3% 3.4% 
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Table 5: Frequency of Monograms Based on Direction of Native Writing 
 
Direction 
Frequency of Monogram Contained in Patterns 
4 0 2 8 6 7 1 5 3 
Left-To-Right 84% 77% 69% 69% 66% 67% 65% 65% 64% 
Right-To-Left 94% 73% 91% 73% 70% 61% 67% 70% 70% 
Top-To-Bottom 91% 64% 64% 77% 73% 86% 64% 41% 45% 
All 86% 75% 70% 70% 67% 67% 65% 64% 63% 
 
Table 6: Frequency of Bigrams Based on Direction of Native Writing 
 
Direction 
Frequency of Bigrams Contained in Patterns 
01 12 78 67 58 25 24 46 63 85 
Left-To-Right 38% 32% 28% 24% 24% 23% 20% 19% 21% 21% 
Right-To-Left 36% 39% 30% 27% 30% 36% 27% 18% 18% 18% 
Top-To-Bottom 45% 32% 55% 50% 18% 14% 41% 45% 5% 9% 
All 38% 32% 30% 26% 24% 24% 22% 21% 20% 20% 
 
 
Table 7: Frequency of Bigrams Based on Handedness of Respondent 
 
Handedness 
Frequency of Bigrams Contained in Patterns 
01 12 78 67 58 25 24 46 63 85 
Ambidexterity 50% 50% 43% 46% 18% 21% 46% 39% 11% 18% 
Left-Handed 46% 37% 28% 26% 21% 20% 26% 23% 26% 21% 
Right-Handed 38% 30% 31% 26% 26% 26% 22% 20% 19% 19% 
All 41% 34% 31% 27% 24% 24% 25% 23% 20% 20% 
 
Table 8: Frequency of Trigrams Based on Direction of Native Writing 
 
Direction 
Frequency of Trigrams Contained in Patterns 
012 678 246 124 258 467 125 852 630 785 
Left-To-Right 28% 19% 17% 16% 18% 13% 13% 13% 12% 11% 
Right-To-Left 33% 24% 18% 18% 21% 15% 18% 6% 18% 15% 
Top-To-Bottom 27% 45% 36% 32% 14% 45% 0% 9% 0% 5% 
All 28% 21% 18% 17% 18% 15% 13% 12% 11% 11% 
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Table 9: Frequency of Trigrams Based on Handedness of Respondent 
 
Handedness 
Frequency of Trigrams Contained in Patterns 
012 678 246 124 258 467 125 852 630 785 
Ambidexterity 46% 39% 39% 32% 14% 29% 14% 11% 7% 11% 
Left-Handed 32% 18% 21% 21% 14% 15% 13% 13% 11% 11% 
Right-Handed 27% 21% 17% 17% 21% 16% 12% 12% 13% 11% 
All 30% 22% 20% 20% 18% 17% 12% 12% 12% 11% 
 
 
Table 10: Overlapping Nodes and Knight Moves within the Secure Patterns Set 
Features Total Denomination 
 
Overlapping Nodes 
 
18.83% 
93.1% 1 node 
6.9%   3 nodes 
 
Knight Moves 
 
9.09% 
64.29% 1 move 
14.29% 2 moves 
21.42% 7 moves 
Both 2.6% 1 node & 1 move 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Number of Possible Patterns for the 9-node Pattern Authentication Scheme with Specific Attributes 
Attributes Length Unique Patterns 
 
 
 
Starts at Node 0 
4 154 
5 684 
6 
7 
2516 
7104 
8 13792 
9 13792 
 
 
Starts at Node 
0 and 
Crosses Node 4 
4 82 
5 
6 
7 
8 
456 
1948 
6152 
12944 
9 13792 
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Table 12: Decreasing the Password Space Using More Attributes from the Survey 
 
Length 
Unique Patterns, No Knight Moves Unique Patterns, 
No Knight Moves + (012) 
4 44 1 
5 160 6 
6 442 20 
 
 
  
